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ABSTRACT
It has been a commonly accepted practice to train pilots and astronauts in expensive, extremely sophisticated, high
fidelity simulators, with as much of the real-world feel and response as possible. High fidelity and high validity have often
been assumed to be inextricably interwoven, although this assumption may not be warranted. The Project Mercury rate-
damping task on the Naval Air Warfare Center's Human Centrifuge Dynamic Flight Simulator in Warminster
(Johnsville), Pennsylvania, the shuttle landing task on the NASA-Ames Research Center's Vertical Motion Simulator at
Moffett Field, California, and the almost complete acceptance by the airline industry of full-up Boeing 767 flight
simulators for transition training of airplane captains, are only a few examples of this approach. For obvious reasons, the
classical models of transfer of training have never been adequately evaluated in aerospace operations, and there have
been few, if any, scientifically valid replacements for the classical models. This paper reviews some of the earlier work
involving transfer of training in aerospace operations, and discusses some of the methods by which appropriate criteria for
assessing the validity of training may be established.
Introduction
Effective functioning of aerospace systems
critically depends on how well the operator can be
trained to perform his relatively complex tasks under
the unique environmental conditions encountered in
space operations. Human factors considerations in
the design of aerospace systems, while acknowledged
to be extremely important, have frequently taken a
back seat to the adaptability and the great capacity
of the operators to learn how to control complex
systems. For example, the space shuttle is operated,
and must function effectively, during launch, orbital
flight, re-entry, and landing. Although the control
characteristics of the vehicle change dramatically
under these different segments of the flight profile,
the operator must be trained to make the system
function effectively under all conditions. Extensive,
and expensive, training has traditionally been used
to help the operator learn how to perform
appropriately.
Training and Transfer of Training
Probably, the most important aspect of any
training program that should be evaluated to
determine its efficacy is the phenomenon known as
"transfer." Transfer of training occurs whenever the
performance on one task has an effect, either
beneficial or detrimental, on the performance of
another task that is performed subsequently.
Positive transfer results when performance on the
initial task leads to improved performance on a
subsequent task; negative transfer results when
performance on the first task has a detrimental effect
on performance of the second task. (1,2)
To quantify the amount of transfer between two
tasks, researchers generally obtain a score based on
the initial performance of the second task for those
individuals who had previously practiced the first
task, and compare the score with the score of initial
performance on the second task obtained from
individuals who did not practice on the first task.
A criterion for the amount of practice, or the degree of
mastery, on the first task is usually specified in
advance. Traditionally, the scores are based on the
amount of practice needed to reach the criterion, e.g.,
speed of performance, accuracy of performance, a
combination of speed and accuracy, or some other
stable measure that can be used to characterize the
performance on each task. (3)
Measuring Transfer of Training
Two classical means of specifying the amount of
transfer involve the concepts of savings and transfer
effectiveness. For example, consider a case where
individuals require an average of ten hours of actual
flight time to achieve adequate proficiency for them
to fly their first solo. If one hour of practice in a
ground-based simulator (i.e., first task) allows a
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similar group of individuals to solo after only 8 hours
of flight time (second task), we see that there is a
savings of 2 hours of flight time.
Expressed quantitatively,
S ffi T(t2:tl=0) - T(t2:tl)
Where S is the savings, T(t2:tl---o)is the time
required to master task 2 given no practice on task I,
and T(t2:tl) is the time required to master task 2 given
previous practice on task I. The effectiveness of
transfer between training in the ground-based
simulator versus the actual aircraft can be expressed
as a ratio of the difference between flight time
needed for the control group (flight practice only) and
the training group (simulator and flight practice),
relative to total simulator time.
Expressed quantitatively,
TE = [T(t2:t1=o)-T(t2:tl)]/ T(tl)
where TE is the training effectiveness ratio,
T(t2:tl=0) is the time required to master task 2, given no
practice on task 1, T(t2:tl) is the time required to
master task 2, given practice on task 1, and T(tl) is the
time actually spent on task 1.
In the example given, we have 10 hours of flight
time needed for the control group [T(t2:tl=0)]minus 8
hours of flight time needed for the group who had
trained on the simulator [T(t2:tl)], divided by 1 hour of
time in the simulator T(tl). This yields a transfer
effectiveness ratio of 2, which means that the one
hour spent in the simulator provided training that
was as effective as two hours in the actual aircraft.
From a practical perspective, this makes good sense,
because much time is often wasted in the aircraft
before it is can be used for training. For example, to
learn techniques for recovery from a stall, the student
pilot must be at sufficient altitude over an
appropriate practice area, and it takes time to get
there in an aircraft.
Because gains in performance that are achieved
from practice usually decrease over time (i.e.,
learning is a negatively accelerating function), the
transfer effectiveness ratio also decreases with
increasing time spent in practice. When the transfer
effectiveness ratio declines to 1.0, there is no training
advantage to be obtained from additional use of a
simulator or training device, although there still
may be other significant advantages.
If, for example, training in an aircraft costs three
times as much as training in a simulator, there will
still be a financial advantage in using the simulator
until the training effectiveness ratio declines to 1/3.
Predicting Transfer of Trainin_
As a general rule, the more similar two tasks are,
the more likely it is that they will interact with one
another. Further, the beneficial or detrimental
nature of the resulting transfer between two tasks
usually depends on the similarity of the displays
(stimulus conditions) and on the similarity of the
controls (required responses) in the two tasks. (4) Four
cases may be distinguished: (5)
Case 1 - HiHi Where the displays and controls
on both the initial and the subsequent tasks are so
similar that they are practically indistinguishable
from one another, transfer will usually be both large
and positive; learning to perform the first task can
provide the equivalent of an opportunity to practice
on the second task. For example, learning to fly in a
particular aircraft, and then attempting to fly
another aircraft of the same type would have
extremely high positive transfer. Another example
would be to fly a high-fidelity simulator of the
aircraft as the first task.
Case 2- LoLo Where the displays and controls
on the initial and subsequent task differ
dramatically from each other, there is generally
little transfer of training between them. For
example, learning how to play a piano probably will
not help someone to learn how to fly an airplane.
Where the displays are
different, but the controls on the two tasks are
similar, transfer of training is usually positive (but
much less effective than in Case 1). This would
generally be the case where one initially learns to fly
in one type of aircraft, and subsequently attempts to
fly a different type of aircraft.
Case 4 - HiLo This case is somewhat more
complex than the other three cases cited. Where the
displays are similar, but the controls are different,
either weak positive transfer or negative transfer
may occur. The weak positive transfer could result
when the displays are highly similar, but the
controls are so different that confusion between them
would be very 'unlikely; an example would be that
occasioned by a flashing red light when driving an
automobile (apply the brakes), or a flashing red
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light indicating the failure of a landing gear to have
locked (recycle the lowering of the gear). The major
advantage of training in this type of situation may
lie in having the individual learn to pay careful
attention to the appropriate stimulus display. In
contrast, if the controls are not only different, but
conflicting, negative transfer would be expected. This
would be the case where two aircraft have similarly
appearing control levers that are placed in the same
location in the cockpit, but with different resulting
functions (e.g., flaps and throttle levers in reversed
positions in two different aircraft). Learning to fly
the first aircraft could interfere with subsequent
flying of the second aircraft (and it could lead to a
major accident).
The Use of Simulators in Traininsz
v
Simulators, and other training devices, have been
widely used throughout the aviation industry, but
their use in the space program had been different, at
least until recently. Generally, commercial pilots
and aircrew were given extensive opportunity to
practice their skills in the operational system before
they were officially required to perform in actual
operations. Further, transfer of training could be
determined in checkout flights, and the efficacy of
specific training programs could be evaluated in
depth. Recently, however, the use of high-fidelity
simulators for training has received such wide
acceptance by the aviation industry that, following
an authorized training program on a high-fidelity
simulator of some new commercial passenger aircraft,
the very first flight of a pilot-in-command can often
be a revenue flight. This relatively recent
development in commercial aviation parallels the
training of astronauts, which usually demands that
the first flight after training be an operational
mission, providing little or no opportunity for
additional training. The aviation industry is now
using a technique that was originally developed in
the space program.
If we consider the conditions under which
astronauts are generally expected to perform in space
missions, we find that both the displays and controls
for training specific operational tasks can often (but
not always) be made to be highly similar. This type
of condition corresponds to Case 1 - HiHi, discussed
previously, and yields a high degree of transfer of
training.
A particularly relevant application of this
training paradigm was used in the early days of
manned space flight, when the original astronauts of
project Mercury experienced realistic acceleration
profiles, and performed control tasks in a Mercury
capsule that was mounted in the (Johnsville) Naval
Air Development (now, Naval Air Warfare) Center's
human centrifuge. (6,7) The centrifuge was used as a
dynamic trainer for a re-entry rate damping task,
largely because it added realistic acceleration cues to
the instrument displays; it also was used to train the
astronautsinsequencemonitoringand emergency
proceduresduringsimulatedlaunchand re-entry
profiles.Following theirhigh-fidelitysimulation
training,the astronautsmastered thenecessary
skills,and were consideredtobe wellpreparedto
functionintheactualoperationalenvironment.
Similarly,the shuttlelanding simulations
conductedatAmes ResearchCenteroverthepast
severalyears(8)have alsotaken advantage of this
generalapproach totraining.A realisticmock-up of
theshuttlecockpit,mounted intheVerticalMotion
Simulator(VMS),was used totrainastronautstoland
theshuttleunder variousconditions,including
reduced visibilityapproaches,high cross-winds,and
steering mechanism failures upon landing. Before any
shuttle pilots ever performed an actual landing in the
shuttle itself, they had already experienced several
landing scenarios in the VMS. As a result of their
performance on the VMS, they were regarded as well
prepared to perform effectively in the actual shuttle
landings.
Cost versus Validity of $imulator_
The major cost of striving to attain a large degree
of transfer of training in high-fidelity simulators is
actual financial cost. Since we know that high
display and control similarity leads to the best
transfer of training, we sometimes go overboard in
insisting that a training simulator must have high
face validity or unnecessarily high fidelity in
representing the actual vehicle. In addition, the
financial payoffs for the simulator manufacturers lie
in providing the most advanced state-of-the-art
devices. The pull of the user community for more and
more sophisticated simulators as training devices,
coupled with the push of the manufacturer to provide
all of the "veils and whistles" often combine to drive
simulator costs ever higher. Although true validity
of training and high fidelity of training devices are
often related, they are definitely separable. This is
an area where considerable research needs to be done,
both to reduce costs, and to establish how much high
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fidelity isactuallyneededto producethebest
transferof training.
LimitatiQn_ of Ground-based Simulation
If one wishes to train an astronaut to function
effectively in the space environment, it is not always
possible to make both displays and controls (i.e.,
stimulus conditions and required responses)
sufficiently similar here on Earth to expect a high
degree of positive transfer. For example, attempting
to don or doff a space suit on Earth versus in orbit
probably involves both similar and different stimulus
conditions that are coupled with similar and
different motor responses. The issue of donning or
doffing a space suit on Earth and in orbit leads to
obvious questions regarding bow one should go about
training astronauts to perform effectively in different
environments.
Skylab experiment M-151 provides an excellent
case in point. The time required to don a space suit on
Earth initially was between 900 and more than 1400
seconds. With practice, this time was reduced to
between 800 and 850 seconds. The time required to don
a space suit in orbit initially shows a dramatic
increase when compared against the preflight times
following practice on Earth, with an initial value for
the first donning in orbit around 1000 to 1100 seconds.
Subsequent attempts in orbit lead to significantly
improved performance, and eventually, some of the
astronauts even perform better in orbit than they ever
did on Earth, with times as low as 669 and 740
seconds. (9)
Although this study was not directed towards
evaluating transfer of training between the
terrestrial and orbital environments, it is clear that
the initial apparent disruption of performance in
orbit could have been due to three of the four possible
cases of transfer of training that we discussed
previously. First, the task of donning a space suit in
orbit could have been disrupted by attempts to don
the suit on the ground; i.e., there was negative
transfer between the two tasks such that the
techniques acquired on Earth interfered with the
techniques required to don the suit in orbit (Case 4,
with negative transfer). A second possible
explanation is that the two tasks were so very
different from one another that donning the suit on
the ground had no effect on donning the suit in orbit
and, had the subjects never practiced on the ground,
the same results would have been obtained in orbit;
i.e., there was no transfer between the two tasks
(Case 2). A third possible explanation is that there
was positive transfer of training from ground-based
results to orbital donning of the suit, and that the
apparent disruption in orbit would have been
significantly greater than that actually obtained if
the terrestrial practice in donning the suit had not
been undertaken (Case 3).
If conlzol groups were used, and donning times
were obtained in orbit for individuals who did not
practice on the ground, it would have been possible to
evaluate the alternatives discussed above. From a
practical point of view, however, it is not likely that
mission planners would have an astronaut don a space
suit for EVA for the very first time in orbit without
any opportunity to practice the task before he/she
gets there. As a result, this issue may have to remain
unresolved for some time. Nevertheless, because
there was an apparent initial disruption of
performance in orbit, it is clear that the task of
donning the space suit on the ground is not the same as
that of donning the suit in orbit (i.e., not Case 1).
To describe a complex task, such as donning a
space suit on Earth, and then to compare it with the
task of donning the same suit in microgravity,
requires the specification of differences in both
stimuli and responses (displays and controls) under
both terrestrial and space conditions. Although the
complexity of the task, and the lack of a theoretical
model with which to characterize the relationships
between stimuli and responses make the solution of
this problem extremely difficult, the general
approach remains feasible.
A similar approach that has been used frequently
is to attempt to create a training environment that is
similar to the operational environment in which the
subjects are expected to perform. Under such
conditions, a high degree of stimulus similarity can
be expected, and if the training task itself is similar
to the operational task, then a high degree of
transfer might also be expected. Unfortunately, as
the next example illustrates, this approach does not
always work as well as might be desired.
The value of underwater training to simulate the
effects of microgravity had been strongly supported
for EVA space assembly tasks such as those initially
proposed for Space Station Freedom; further, the
Soviet cosmonauts who were to perform EVAs in
missions on Mir were also given extensive underwater
training. It was believed that this approach,
coupled with work on air-bearing platforms, would be
appropriate for training astronauts in the satellite
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recoverytaskssuchasthosethatwererequiredfor
STS-49.Apparently,the inertialandviscous
dampingcharacteristicsof the underwater
environment, and the limited degrees of freedom for
movements on the air-bearing platforms, were
sufficiently different from the conditions encountered
in space that the training was not fully adequate to
prepare the astronauts for their tasks in STS-49. For
example, continuous reactive rotational movements of
the astronauts are difficult to initiate under water,
but they are relatively easy to stop; in space these
movements are extremely easy to initiate, but they
are very difficult to stop. Similarly, air-bearing
platforms will not respond to forces that are applied
orthogonally to their surfaces; no such "null-planes"
are present in space. The delays and difficulties in
retrieving the satellite appear to have been at least
partially due to the inadequacy of the underwater
training.
In fact, based on the available evidence, the
actual value of the underwater training for STS-49
cannot be fully determined. As was previously noted
in the context of Skylab experiment M-151, we have
no means to establish how good the astronauts'
performance would have been without the
underwater training. Thus, although it is clear that
underwater training on the satellite recovery task
did not completely prepare the astronauts for
performing the task in orbit, it could have been of
value, or it could have actually provided negative
transfer by having the astronauts master techniques
that relied on viscous damping and other
characteristics of the underwater environment that
were not available in orbit. Nevertheless, the
flexibility and the perseverance of the astronauts
allowed for successful completion of their mission
despite possible inadequacies in their training.
Space in Little Piece_: The Valu(_ of
Troining in Micro_avi.ty
For the training of astronauts, there is probably
no better way than parabolic flight in the KC-135 or
similar aircraft to familiarize them with the kinds
of problems that they will encounter in space.
Although the duration of any single parabolic
phase is too brief for the conduct of a complex task,
such as donning a space suit, parabolic flight does
provide a close approximation of the microgravity
conditions encountered in space. Further, the
appreciation of the value of parabolic flight as a
technique for training astronauts to function
appropriately in the microgravity environment of
space is a relatively recent phenomenon. At Johnson
Space Center, the KC-135 aircraft has been used to
fly "zero-gravity" parabolas. The astronaut trainees
have taken advantage of the 20 to 30 seconds of
"weightlessness" that are produced in this aircraft to
practice on critical tasks that they are expected to
perform in orbit. It is now generally believed that, if
practice is restricted to the hypogravity phases of
parabolic flight, the astronauts will be able to
master new techniques that would have been
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to learn on the
ground. (10)
Similarly, operational tasks to be performed in
orbit, such as obtaining blood samples, conducting
surgical procedures, operating control devices,
attaching sensors, implementing various
experimental protocols, or donning a space suit, are
now practiced, part by part, during the brief periods
of hypogravity achieved in parabolic flight. By
performing small individual segments of the task in
hypogravity, and combining segments across multiple
parabolas, astronauts are believed to achieve a high
degree of proficiency before they actually enter orbit.
Thus, the cumulaiive effects of training across several
hypo-gravity phases of a series of parabolas
probably can be extremely useful, particularly if the
training is done systematically.
Validating and Improving Transfer of
Training: A Reasonable First Step
Unfortunately, as was the case with the
centrifuge simulations of the Mercury launch and
reentry profiles at Johnsville, the shuttle landing
simulations on the VMS at Ames, and the underwater
training in the WETF at JSC, there has been little
scientific evaluation or documentation of the value of
the training methods described above. Despite the
adoption of these general techniques throughout the
aerospace industry, the choice and use of simulations
remains more art than science.
Recently, and particularly within NASA, it has
become a popular dictum that it is impossible to
manage something unless one is able to measure it. As
far as transfer of training is concerned, we know how
to measure it. Nevertheless, as a rule, we do not do
so. Without measures of transfer of training, there
are no ways to validate the training or to improve it.
Thus, one of the most important tasks that currently
lies before the training community is to provide
measures of transfer of training that can be used for
validating and improving the training.
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Animportant,andreasonable,first stepin
substantiatingthealreadycommonuseof parabolic
flight in training astronauts could be to wvisit
Skylab experiment M-151. That study was discussed
here as a demonstration of the value of microgravity
in training; it should be repeated, but with a new
twist. In this case, we could have astronauts train in
donning a space suit either on the ground or in the
hypogravity phase of parabolic flight. If the
previously reported disruption occurs following
ground-based training, but not following parabolic
flight training, the practical value of parabolic
flight for training purposes will have finally been
appropriately documented.
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